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By examining a prior government hearing that investigated instances and patterns of housing 
discrimination in the U.S., a more accurate picture of the damage created by government policies that 
supported housing discrimination, racial segregation, and economic inequality can be presented. This 
Article focuses specifically upon the 1962 Housing Discrimination hearings convened in Washington 
D.C. by the United States Civil Rights Commission. The hearings focused upon housing discrimination 
and patterns of racial segregation in the Washington D.C. Metropolitan region produced as a direct 
result of government policies pursued and endorsed for over thirty years by the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA). In addition, this Article will not only expose the ineffectiveness of the 1962 
hearings in addressing these very important socio-economic issues but also identify current racial 
discrimination and economic equality at the center of today’s damaging housing crisis. In sum, this 
Article argues for addressing past, present, and future racial discrimination patterns in housing with a 
much more aggressive and honest approach to a problem rooted in economic inequality and ineffective 
government policy. Even in the age of resistance to governmental solutions to economic inequality, the need 
for just such an approach is justified in this instance. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
On September 9, 1957, Republican President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed the Civil Rights Act 
of 1957 into law.1 It was the first civil rights law passed in the United States since 1875.2 The period 
from 1875 to 1957 was an era of stagnant racial progress in the United States. Laws legalizing 
discrimination and racial segregation were prevalent throughout the country and the federal government 
did little to address the problem. Discrimination and racial segregation were also a frequent occurrence 
in states without overt laws legalizing these practices.3 Further, custom and outright mob violence 
perpetuated America’s racial caste system. For these reasons, the passage of a civil rights law in 1957 was 
quite an achievement. 
While the law was an historic accomplishment, it was also a compromised piece of legislation 
that reflected the nation’s inability to get beyond the issue of race in the twentieth century. President 
Eisenhower was among those disappointed by the new law when he signed the bill. In issuing no 
comment on the new civil rights law, he demonstrated his disdain for its limitations.4 However, the law 
authorized the creation of the United States Civil Rights Commission, the first government entity 
devoted to the issue of civil rights in the history of the nation.5 
The significance of the period between civil rights laws enacted during Reconstruction6 and the 
Civil Rights Act of 1957 is noteworthy. It was during this period that most of the nation’s African 
American population became second-class citizens who were forced to exist under “Jim Crow” 
conditions, whereby civic barriers were enforced legally, institutionally, and by custom.7 African 
Americans were segregated from the rest of the population in every facet of daily life in the United 
States, including public education, housing, employment, and socialization. And the perpetuation of a 
dual system of housing (home ownership and home location) during an important segment of the Jim 
Crow period left an indelible imprint on the structure of racial and economic equality in the United 
States, now and for the future.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* The author currently teaches at the Michigan State University College of Law. He is both Director of the 
Housing Law Clinic and Clinical Associate Professor. He wishes to thank the following individuals for their assistance 
and support in completing this article: Dean Joan Howarth; Professor Michelle Halloran, Director of Clinical Programs, 
Michigan State University College of Law; and the entire staff of the Michigan State University School of Law Library. 
1 FOSTER RHEA DULLES, THE CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, 1957–1965, at 1(1968). 
2 Id. 
3 MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN’T WAIT (Penguin Books 2000) (1963).  
4 W.H. Lawrence, President Backs U.S. Court Order, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1957, 
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=F70D13F7385A177B93C2A81782D85F438585F9.  
5 DULLES, supra note 1, at 3. 
6 “Reconstruction” is generally considered the historical period immediately following the Civil War of 1861–
1865 and the end of chattel slavery in 1865. The period lasted from approximately 1865–1877. 
7 THE RICHARD WRIGHT ENCYCLOPEDIA 342 (Jerry Washington Ward & Robert Butler eds., 2008).  
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The federal government’s intentional policy decisions promoted racial segregation and economic 
inequality in the housing market from 1934 to 1968.8 During this period, the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) adopted and promoted discriminatory housing policies in the United States.9 
These policies led to segregated housing patterns and created segregated cities and neighborhoods. 
Housing policies have therefore contributed to an enduring economic inequality where whites have 
accumulated far more wealth than minorities, particularly African Americans.10 
Thus, the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and the creation of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission could 
have been a moment of serious social and political progress. Instead, the law reaffirmed and reinforced 
lawmakers’ attitudes of racial inequality towards African Americans, just as President Eisenhower’s 
disappointment had foreshadowed. The activities of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission were impressive 
but were conducted with limitations and purpose.11 One significant example is the April 1962 hearings of 
the Commission convened in Washington, D.C. to examine housing discrimination in the metropolitan 
Washington, D.C. area.12  
An analysis of the April 1962 hearings on housing discrimination in Washington, D.C. and the 
surrounding region reveals the weaknesses of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 that Eisenhower had 
suspected, as well as an overall flawed approach to solving the problem.  
Today, with a devastating housing crisis still dominating the nation’s economic affairs, lessons 
for the future can be learned by examining the April 1962 hearings and exploring the mistakes made by 
the government in the following years. Specifically, a re-examination of the April 1962 hearings is an 
opportunity to consider a new approach to addressing economic equality along racial lines and to 
consider new approaches to current problems in the housing market.  
Part II of this Article will focus upon the creation of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission in 1962. 
Part III will summarize and report on the Commission’s April 1962 hearings regarding housing 
discrimination in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. Part IV will evaluate the 1962 hearings and 
consider the economic impact of government policies in the housing market that have disproportionately 
impacted the lives of African Americans in accumulating wealth over the years.  
Part V will consider the lessons learned 1962 hearings and the 2007 housing foreclosure crisis to 
examine what can be done to change systemic, entrenched housing discrimination against and economic 
inequality amongst some African Americans. Finally, Part VI will consider recommendations to remedy 
economic inequality and housing discrimination, emphasizing the need to address the problems created 
by past government policy as well as new issues created by the government’s subsequent attempts to 
increase the rate of homeownership in the African American community. 
II.  THE UNITED STATES CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1957 
A. A Civil Rights Law, At Last  
The Civil Rights Act of 1957 addressed several areas of civil rights in a fairly conservative 
manner. Most notably, the Act authorized the creation of the United States Commission on Civil 
Rights.13 The Commission was created as an “independent, bipartisan fact finding agency established by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 DAVID M.P. FREUND, COLORED PROPERTY: STATE POLICY AND WHITE RACIAL POLITICS IN SUBURBAN 
AMERICA 155 (2007). 
9 Id. 
10 MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON 
RACIAL INEQUALITY 18–19 (10th ed. 2006).  
11 DULLES supra note 1, at 2–3. 
12 UNITED STATES CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, HOUSING IN WASHINGTON: HEARINGS BEFORE THE UNITED 
STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 3 (1962) [hereinafter HOUSING IN WASHINGTON]. 
13 DULLES, supra note 1, at 2. 
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the Congress,”14 with the following duties: “To investigate complaints regarding deprivation of the right 
to vote; To study legal developments constituting a denial of equal protection of the laws under the 
Constitution; and; To appraise the Federal laws and policies with respect to equal protection.”15 
 While the Commission’s duties were devoted to the issue of civil rights, the Commission had no 
authority to enforce laws relating to equal protection or to punish any individual or entity for racially 
racial discriminatory conduct.16 Even if the Commission identified a violation of federal law proven by 
actual testimonial evidence, the Commission could do nothing address the problem.17 
Even with these limitations, the Commission held significant potential:  
[E]mpowered to assemble authentic and documented information, to be incorporated in 
the public record, this new Federal agency would be able to build up to an unassailable 
factual record of the status of civil rights throughout the country. From this base it could 
then point the way towards more effective policies, on the part of both the Executive 
and Congress . . . .18 
The Commission was formed during a period when civil rights and relations were particularly volatile in 
the United States. In 1954, the Supreme Court rendered its most famous decision affecting race relations 
in the United States: Brown v. Board of Education.19 Brown effectively declared “Jim Crow” laws in the 
United States illegal and unconstitutional and ushered in an era of desegregation and integration that is 
still evolving today.20 
In December 1955, Rosa Parks’ legendary act of civil disobedience while on a Montgomery, 
Alabama, transit bus inspired the modern civil rights movement.21 Numerous other individual and 
collective efforts to oppose the nation’s racial caste system soon followed.22 By 1957, the entire “Jim 
Crow” system had come under increased scrutiny in the face of fierce resistance of change. It was in this 
context that the Commission was created. 
Further integration, and acts of civil disobedience, ensued. In 1957, nine African American 
students challenged the “separate but equal” public school system when they integrated Central High 
School in Little Rock, Arkansas.23 By 1960, in Greensboro, North Carolina, college students began “sit 
in” campaigns at lunch counters to dramatize racial segregation.24 In 1961, the integration of interstate 
bus transportation would be commenced through the well-known “Freedom Riders” campaign.25 With 
so much change occurring in the United States, the inception of a Commission devoted to studying civil 
rights was both appropriate and necessary. 
B. The Commission 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 HOUSING IN WASHINGTON, supra note 12, at 3.  
15 Id. 
16 DULLES, supra note 1, at 2–3.  
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
20 WALDO E. MARTIN, JR., BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 1 (1998).  
21 RUTH ASHBY, ROSA PARKS: FREEDOM RIDER 56 (2008).  
22 Id. at 63–75. 
23 Brian Gilmore, The Courage of the Little Rock None, SOUTH BEND TRIB., Aug. 24, 2007, 
http://articles.southbendtribune.com/2007-08-24/news/26789243_1_black-students-diversity-in-public-education-
public-schools.  
24 Brian Gilmore, Sit-ins Changed Society, PITTSBURGH TRIB., Feb. 7, 2010, 
http://triblive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/opinion/columnists/guests/s_665891.html.  
25 RAYMOND ARSENAULT, FREEDOM RIDERS: 1961 AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 3 (2006). 
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Notwithstanding the limitations on its authority to enforce civil rights, the initial Commission 
was very impressive. It was comprised of John Hannah, President of Michigan State University; Robert 
G. Storey, Dean of Southern Methodist University Law School; John S. Battle, a former Governor of 
Virginia; Father Theodore M. Hesburgh, President of Notre Dame; J. Ernest Wilkins, an Assistant 
Secretary of Labor; and Doyle E. Carleton, a former Governor of Florida.26  
The initial Commission had no female members and only one African American member, J. 
Ernest Wilkins.27 Unfortunately, Wilkins resigned due to illness shortly after his appointment to the 
Commission. He was replaced by another African American, George M. Johnson, the former Dean of 
the Howard University School of Law from 1946 to 1958.28 President Hannah was Chairman of the 
Commission and Storey was Vice Chairman.29 Hannah is worthy of closer examination because of his 
unlikely rise as a leader in the area of civil rights.30 Hannah had no prior background experience in civil 
rights issues or government policy. Yet in his 1966 article, Civil Rights and the Public Universities, Hannah 
wrote intelligently on the topic, referring to the issue of civil rights as a “problem” that did not exist 
“exclusively in the South,” but in the “East and the North and the West as well.”31 The Commission’s 
influence on Hannah’s views on civil rights was evident in this article:  
The Negro is forever marked by the color of his skin as one apart. He cannot lose 
himself in the homogeneity in which the rest of us take refuge, and he suffers under a 
dreadful handicap as a consequence. The task of education is to persuade his white 
brothers and sisters that color makes no difference. Only a beginning has been made in 
the long, hard fight against race prejudice, but doors of opportunity, so long closed 
arbitrarily to the Negro, are slowly opening in the professions and the higher vocations.32 
Father Theodore Hesburgh, another initial commission appointee, described the commission as 
“a kind of national conscience in the matter of civil rights.”33 Commissioners faced physical threats in 
the early years, and they were “publicly harassed in the media and politics for most of the commission’s 
history.” 34 Despite these challenges, the commission survived; it “became known for its integrity and its 
hallmark independence from political authority by doing its work without fear.”35 
III. THE APRIL 1962 HEARINGS ON HOUSING IN WASHINGTON, D.C.  
A. The Commission Pursues its Mission 
On April 12–13, 1962 in Washington, D.C., the commission held hearings on the state of the 
city’s housing.36 While many of the Commission’s original members remained, there were several 
notable.37 President John F. Kennedy appointed new members to the Commission in 1961, including 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 DULLES supra note 1, at 18.  
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 19.  
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 John A. Hannah, Civil Rights and the Public Universities, 37 J. HIGHER EDUC. 61, 67 (1966) (“Finally, we must 
acknowledge that the real problems of civil rights are not to be found exclusively in the South. They exist in the East and 
the North and the West as well.”). 
32 Id. at 65. 
33 MARY FRANCES BERRY, AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE UNITED STATES CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION AND THE 
CONTINUING STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM IN AMERICA 4 (2009). 
34 Id. 
35 Id.  
36 HOUSING IN WASHINGTON, supra note 12, at 3. 
37 Id. 
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Spottswood Robinson, Dean of the Howard University School of Law. His appointment is particularly 
noteworthy because of his civil rights background.38 
An accomplished litigator in the civil rights field, Robinson had close associations with the 
Howard University School of Law and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) Legal Defense Fund.39 He was also a member of the Brown v. Board of Education legal team, 
which included Charles Hamilton Houston, Thurgood Marshall, and Julian Dugas, among others.40  
The District of Columbia hearing was not the first convened by the Commission. The 
Commission had previously held hearings in Los Angeles, Atlanta, Chicago, Detroit, and New Orleans. 
These hearings explored several civil rights issues in addition to housing, such as voting, public 
education, public accommodations, and the administration of justice.41 At the outset of the hearings, 
Chairman Hannah noted that these previous hearings by the Commission strongly suggested that 
housing was an area that warranted more attention by the Commission: 
Our studies have revealed that one of the most crucial civil rights problems is housing. 
Housing is the one commodity in the American market that is not freely available on 
equal terms [to] everyone who can afford to pay. 
Throughout the country large groups of American citizens, mainly American Negroes, 
but other groups as well, are denied an equal opportunity to choose where they will live. 
Much of the housing market is closed to them for reasons unrelated to their personal 
worth or ability to pay, and in the restricted market that is open to them, Negroes 
generally pay more for equivalent housing than do the favored majority.42 
The Commission convened the District of Columbia hearings because, as Chairman Hannah 
noted, Washington is “the window of America” and “the entire nation” would be judged by the 
commission’s actions there.43 The Commission also sought to examine the housing problem in the 
Washington Metropolitan Area.44 
B. A Discriminatory Environment 
The numerous witnesses that testified at the hearing established that African Americans 
experienced denial of access to equal housing 45 and racial discrimination related to home ownership46 in 
the Washington Metropolitan Area. The discussion below provides a summary of just some of the 
testimony presented at the hearing.  
The first to testify was Walter N. Tobriner, President of the District of Columbia Board of 
Commissioners. Mr. Tobriner confirmed that Washington and the metropolitan region were segregated: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 DULLES, supra note 1, at 100. 
39 Spottswood Robinson III was born in Richmond, VA. He graduated from the Howard University School of 
Law in 1939 and eventually served as head of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund’s Virginia Office. It was there that he 
filed one of the school desegregation cases that would eventually result in the Brown v. Board of Education decision of 
1954 outlawing segregation in the United States. Robinson was a well-known successful civil rights lawyer in segregated 
Virginia over the years. He also served as Dean of the Howard University School of Law and was the first African 
American appointed to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the United States Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Robinson, U.S. Appeals Judge, Dies in Virginia at 82, JET MAGAZINE, Nov. 2, 1998, at 57. 
40 Spottswood William Robinson III, BROWN @ 50: FULFILLING THE PROMISE, 
http://www.brownat50.org/brownbios/BioJudgeSpottswoodRobinson.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2012). 
41 HOUSING IN WASHINGTON, supra note 12, at 4.  
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 4–5. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. Evidence of discrimination in the housing market is presented throughout the hearings. 
46 See HOUSING IN WASHINGTON, supra note 12. 
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Eighty percent of the region’s African Americans were residing in the District of Columbia.47 While Mr. 
Tobriner also testified that African Americans found Washington, D.C. to be a city where there was 
“hope for equal opportunity,” Tobriner acknowledged that equal opportunity had not been achieved.48 
Tobriner spoke little about how the city’s housing market contributed to the segregation but did allude 
to various programs being implemented to provide additional low-income housing opportunities.49  
Sociologists George and Eunice Grier presented data on segregation in the region and noted that 
the African American population had been increasing in the District of Columbia but “declining” in the 
“suburbs” since 1920.50 Of particular note was the testimony of George Grier, in which he explained 
that Washington, D.C. has had a significant African American population for decades.51 Some African 
Americans families had lived in Washington, D.C. for five or six generations. However, the African 
Americans in Washington, D.C. were not becoming dispersed in the area, according to Mr. Grier; rather, 
they were becoming more concentrated in specific areas of the metropolitan region.52  
Furthermore, African Americans were at an “economic disadvantage” in attaining home 
ownership although they earned incomes “above the national average for non-whites,” and as a result, 
could afford to purchase homes in almost exclusively white areas of the city.53 These areas, Glover Park 
and Woodley Road, however, remained exclusively white even though African Americans could afford 
to reside there.54 Segregation in the face of African Americans’ moderate income is a key fact in 
understanding the overall issue of segregation and discrimination in the area.55  
Robert Weaver, Administrator for the Housing and Home Finance Agency also acknowledged 
the presence of displacement and racial concentration, and advocated opening “suburban areas . . . to all 
elements of the population.”56 Until that occurred, he urged, the Washington, D.C. region would 
“continue to suffer from too great concentrations of ethnic groups in too small a sector of the total 
metropolitan area.”57 
 Sterling Tucker, Executive Director of the Washington Urban League,58 also testified at the 
hearing.59 Tucker testified that housing discrimination in the metropolitan region is part of an “economic 
monster.”60 Tucker offered recommendations to the Commission based on its own 1961 housing 
report.61 The recommendations stressed the need to address neighborhood segregation patterns, 
development as it affects African American neighborhoods, housing discrimination, and relocation issues 
that arise when African Americans are displaced.62 Tucker testified that segregation patterns in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Id. at 8. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 15. 
51 HOUSING IN WASHINGTON, supra note 12, at 18. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 19. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 HOUSING IN WASHINGTON, supra note 12, at 35. 
57 Id. at 35.  
58 The Greater Washington Urban League was founded in 1938 and is one of more than 100 affiliates of the 
National Urban League. A major civil rights and social services organization, the League has been dealing effectively 
with a wide range of social and economic problems for seventy-one years. See History, GREATER WASHINGTON URBAN 
LEAGUE, http://www.gwul.org/about/history (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). 
59 HOUSING IN WASHINGTON, supra note 12, at 40.  
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 40. 
62 Id. at 41.  
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suburbs were “firmly entrenched” and that it was “virtually impossible for a non-white family—
regardless of means . . . to secure modern suburban housing.”63 
 Tucker, like many other witnesses, testified on the high concentration of African Americans in 
the city, as opposed to the suburbs.64 He additionally testified that thirty-six percent of the African 
Americans in the city owned their homes while only twenty-eight percent of whites in the city owned 
their homes.65 While this could be viewed in a positive manner, Tucker noted that this only speaks to the 
industrious nature of the African American experience; the fact that they are forced to reside in the city 
is a tragic hidden reality behind the statistic.66  
 Tucker’s points, and the pronouncements of many others, are historically consistent in 
Washington, D.C. as well as most major American cities in the twentieth century.67 Large numbers of 
African Americans migrated to large cities across the country and eventually discovered that they were 
soon segregated in these cities and urban communities.68 In these large metropolitan areas, the reasons 
for segregation were almost always tied to the effect of racial attitudes and policies on housing, as 
suggested by Tucker’s testimony.69  
Testimony in the Commission’s Washington, D.C. hearing also supported a wider analysis of 
how housing discrimination in the United States and segregation was achieved. The testimony of Mrs. 
Adolph Williams, President of the Montgomery County Branch of the NAACP, is one of the best 
examples of this official and unofficial policy.70  
Mrs. Williams described for the Commission her own experience in seeking to purchase a house 
in the suburbs. Mrs. Williams testified that she and her husband, a dentist, sought to purchase a home in 
the city of Norbeck, located in Montgomery County, Maryland, where “Negroes” were already residing.71 
Mrs. Williams identified a house in a newspaper and spoke with a real estate agent over the telephone. 
The agent had already identified Mrs. Williams’ husband as a “Negro.” On this basis, the agent 
immediately raised the price of the house by $1,000 stating that the newspaper price had been a 
mistake.72  
Later, Mrs. Williams inquired regarding another house in Montgomery County. That agent 
pushed to meet with Mrs. Williams before she could see the house but Mrs. Williams insisted on meeting 
the agent at the house.73 The description of the meeting at the house is as follows: 
I got to the house a little ahead of the agent, and I went in, and when the owner 
introduced me, he seemed very surprised to see me, and when the owner introduced us, 
he said, ‘You can look around, if you want to,’ and he excused himself from the living 
room and went into the kitchen, and he asked the owner whether or not he thought I 
was a Negro, and she gave him some ambiguous answer. He made no attempt to try to 
sell me the home or interest me in the house. I asked him the price of the home. He was 
not sure, but he gave me a price which was a thousand dollars higher than the asking 
price. When I asked him when the house would be available for occupancy, he didn’t 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Id.  
64 HOUSING IN WASHINGTON, supra note 12, at 42. 
65 Id. at 42.  
66 Id.  
67 JOHN F. MCDONALD, URBAN AMERICA: GROWTH, CRISIS, AND REBIRTH 108–11 (2007).  
68 Id.  
69 CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, AFTER BROWN: THE RISE AND RETREAT OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 80 
(2006). 
70 HOUSING IN WASHINGTON, supra note 12, at 99. 
71 Id. at 100.  
72 Id.  
73 Id.  
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know. He had absolutely no information about the house he was showing to me. After I 
looked through the house, I told him I would like to buy it and I wanted to sign a 
contract that day. He said I could not sign the contract . . . .74 
 Additionally, Mrs. Williams testified that she continued to pursue the purchase of the house 
despite further resistance from the real estate company.75 There were not only additional stall tactics, but 
the president of the company also expressly advised Mrs. Williams that if he sold her the house, “he 
would be ruined.”76 The family also had trouble securing financing for their home purchase.  People who 
found out that the Williams were moving into the home—including members of the loan company’s 
board of directors—pressured the loan company and attempted to prevent it from extending a mortgage 
loan to the family.77 It was not until Mrs. Williams told the loan company that the U.S. Justice 
Department was interested in her experience purchasing a home in the suburban area that the sale of the 
house was completed. The family finally moved into the house on June 15, 1961.78  
 On July 3, 1961, a hangman’s noose was placed on the windshield of Mrs. Williams’ car followed 
by the burning of a cross on her porch on July 4, 1961.79 The Williams family also received a bomb 
threat shortly after moving into their new house.80  
 Mrs. Williams’ testimony is just one example of the environment in Washington, D.C. at the 
time of the hearings. Others who testified provided additional details regarding the hostile actions of 
various individual actors in the Washington housing market as well as the racial attitudes of the time that 
contributed to the rampant racial discrimination in the region.  
  Marion Johnson, Vice President of the Alexandria, Virginia, Council on Human Relations, 
provided testimony relating to Alexandria, Virginia, a city just outside the District of Columbia.81 
According to Vice President Johnson, African Americans faced serious obstacles to obtaining housing in 
the city of Alexandria from a variety of directions. “Decent, sanitary housing on any level” was 
unavailable to African Americans as a result of the actions of “financial institutions, private builders, and 
other segments of the homebuilding industry” in working to prevent African Americans from obtaining 
such housing.82 In addition, according to Vice President Johnson, the Alexandria city government also 
worked to ensure that African Americans could not purchase housing in Alexandria.83 
 Reverend Charles N. Mason Jr., past Chairman of the Social Action Committee of the Silver 
Spring, Maryland Ministerial Association, testified to similar conditions in Montgomery County, 
Maryland, a suburban area just outside of Washington.84 Reverend Mason testified that “exclusive 
minded” property owners, real estate developers, and lenders, who worked together to prevent African 
American families from gaining entrance into suburban communities, were the reason African-
Americans had difficulties in locating and purchasing suburban housing.85 
 Arguably, as opposed to oral testimony, the most striking evidence presented during the hearings 
was a racial map testimonial of Washington, D.C. The map revealed that in the Washington 
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Metropolitan Area, African Americans were largely segregated into a small portion of the region.86 
Whites, on the other hand, resided mostly outside the city in Montgomery County, or in particular 
neighborhoods within the city.87 The population percentages were nearly identical.88  
 In the inner city, African Americans comprised approximately seventy-five to one hundred 
percent of the population in several neighborhoods.89 In outer city neighborhoods and in suburban 
areas, whites comprised over ninety percent of the population.90 In other words, the region in 1962 was 
segregated by race, in housing and in neighborhoods.91 
 C. The Government and the Banks 
 Financial institutions and representatives from the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) also 
provided testimony at the hearing. This segment of the hearing provides information relating to the 
historical role the federal government played in perpetuating racial discrimination, segregation, and 
economic inequality in the Washington Metropolitan Area through its lending policy.  
 The FHA was created in 1934 amidst the economic catastrophe known as “the Great 
Depression.”92 The purpose of the agency, like that of other agencies that preceded it, was to stimulate 
the private housing market during a difficult economic time in the country.93 The agency, from the very 
beginning, never built any homes or made any loans to any consumers.94 The main function of the 
agency is to provide insurance against loss on housing loans made by private lending institutions.95 This 
is a critical function of the housing market because it encourages lending. Financial institutions are more 
likely to extend loans if they possess some protection against potential losses.96 
 The creation of the FHA was a continuation of efforts commenced by the federal government 
when it created the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC).97 The HOLC was created to stimulate 
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the housing market by removing poor performing mortgages from the U.S. housing market.98 
Consumers with mortgages in danger of default or foreclosure were provided with refinancing options in 
order to remove these mortgages from the housing market.99 The program was highly successful in that 
it changed the nation’s antiquated mortgage system where the mortgages on houses were not fully 
amortized to a system where the loan was fully amortized for a longer period of time. This enabled the 
consumer to actually repay the loan.100  
 But the new mortgage system instituted through the creation of HOLC also created an appraisal 
system with inherent and deliberate racial discrimination as a key part of its operations.101 The system 
created a code system for neighborhoods where the HOLC would or would not extend refinancing 
opportunities.102 Considering that black neighborhoods were “deemed undesirable” and placed in the 
lowest appraisal category by the HOLC, the system essentially removed access to the suburban mortgage 
market in the U.S. from African Americans as far back as the 1930’s.103 The FHA would eventually 
adopt the system adopted by the HOLC when it began operating in 1934.104 While the practical reason 
the HOLC adopted a system of valuation for properties was to determine the “productive life of 
housing,” the racism underlying the policy decision by the government created agency had a profound 
impact upon racial equality into the future.105 
 In 1934, when the FHA was created and began its operations, the agency was using the HOLC 
appraisal system to determine mortgage insurance protection for consumers.106 Under the HOLC 
system, African American neighborhoods and mixed neighborhoods both had little chance to obtain 
government support for the purchase of a home.107 The racially discriminatory policy was “[b]uilt into 
the agency’s appraisal procedures and lending policies.” There was “an explicit commitment to racial 
exclusion” by the agency that was “codified to a series of Residential Security Maps commissioned by the 
FHLBB in 1935.” Accordingly, the HOLC worked with the lenders and realtors to design “maps . . . 
which ranked neighborhoods on a scale of A (most desirable, and hence, most valuable) to D (in 
‘decline’ and least valuable).”108 
The neighborhoods considered “D” received a code “red” under the HOLC system and thus, 
the system known as “redlining” was born.109 Redlining, long linked to banks and other institutions 
outside the government, is essentially a creation of the federal government.110 The system that was 
designed did reflect the racial attitudes prior to the creation of the HOLC but the agency and the federal 
government created the system.111  
Even more destructively, the FHA not only provided insurance protection on the consumer loan 
transactions, the agency also provided protection to builders constructing new housing.112 For decades, if 
a developer (builder) did not include a racial covenant that excluded blacks and other groups from ever 
purchasing and/or occupying the house, the FHA provided no insurance to the builder.113 The FHA 	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policy was complex but does explain America’s racial history and the current state of race relations in the 
United States. The FHA refused to insure mortgages in “racially mixed areas” but also refused to insure 
“the homes” as well unless the home and the community complied with the racist occupancy standards 
imposed upon the industry and consumers.114 
These historical facts substantiate the testimony at the Washington, D.C. hearings of the 
witnesses from the banking industry and from the government in April 1962.  
Thomas C. Barringer testified at the hearings on behalf of the FHA.115 Barringer was the 
Director of the Washington, D.C. FHA Insuring Office, an office that served not only Washington, 
D.C., but also suburban cities such as Falls Church, Va., Alexandria, Va., and suburban counties such as 
Prince George’s County, and Montgomery County.116  
Barringer testified that it was the FHA policy that properties should be “made available to all 
qualified applicants without regard to their race, creed or color.”117 However, in the same statement he 
admitted that “the opportunities” for African Americans and other “non-European minorities” to 
purchase anywhere in the area (including the historically exclusively white areas) was “still limited.”118 
 Barringer’s testimony regarding the ability of the FHA to compel non-discriminatory conduct by 
builders who were receiving the FHA’s insurance protection was quite revealing. The questioning came 
from Berl Bernhard, Staff Director of the United States Commission on Civil Rights in 1962:119 
Mr. Bernhard: Would it be accurate to say that the affirmative policy you are talking 
about of encouraging open occupancy only becomes an operating procedure when the 
locality or the State has a fair housing law in effect? 
Mr. Barringer: We have no right to deny a builder assistance—I mean FHA insurance—
on the basis of what position he may take. We have jobs built on an open occupancy 
basis, and we are delighted to have them, but we have not been able to tell a builder: 
‘Unless you provide for open occupancy we will cut off your commitments.’120 
In other words, the FHA could not guarantee the construction of properties that would be open 
to anyone for purchase regardless of race. Barringer admitted that the FHA’s only means of opening up 
areas to integration was through “encouragement.”121 Barringer confirmed the speculation of lawyers, 
economists, sociologists and politicians regarding the FHA policy. 
Paul P. Cooke, National Vice Chairman of the American Veterans Committee, also confirmed 
the policy of the FHA as well as the testimony of Mr. Barringer. Mr. Cooke testified of actual instances 
where qualified African Americans (Edmund Millard and Joseph Edwards) sought to purchase homes in 
the suburbs that were set aside exclusively for whites.122 Mr. Cooke elaborated that there were thousands 
of homes being built currently in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area and African Americans, even 
if qualified, could not purchase any of these properties.123 
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“This is often referred to as the white noose around the black core,” Cooke stated, “with 
Negroes heavily in the center of the city and the white noose of suburban America around this core.”124 
Mr. Cooke’s testimony identified actual individuals who were denied an opportunity to purchase housing 
as a direct result of government policy.125 Mr. Cooke even provided the names of individuals who were 
discriminated against and the details of the specific incident.126  
Mr. Cooke also testified regarding other individuals who were denied the opportunity to 
purchase homes in desirable suburban areas in the Washington D.C. region.127 In addition, Mr. Cooke 
testified that these individuals earned high incomes and would easily financially qualify for the purchase 
of a property.128 This would directly challenge any suggestion that even if these individuals had been 
extended credit they would not have qualified for a long term mortgage loan.129 
IV.  WHAT DO THE HEARINGS MEAN? 
A. Wealth accumulation 
The real meaning of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission’s April 1962 hearings is that housing 
discrimination, racial segregation, and economic inequality have been persistent problems in our society 
and share a direct relationship.130 Unfortunately, the Commission did not discuss this problem131 or the 
wealth gap between the races that exists today as a result of the some of the events described by the 
witnesses.132 
Wealth is the key to understanding economic inequality in the United States because it is 
different from income; wealth is permanent and extends opportunities to families for generations.133 It is 
how families have been able to put their children through college and to purchase a home of their 
own.134 
In the United States, the major path to wealth accumulation historically has been and still is 
home ownership.135 It is not one’s regular paycheck but is more permanent items such as home equity, 
stocks, bonds, inheritance; your assets minus your liabilities.136 White families historically have been in a 
much better position to accumulate wealth in this society because their home ownership rates have 
always been higher than the rest of the population.137 This is where government housing policy has been 
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so destructive. The home ownership rates (and the gap), as perpetuated through government policy, have 
been described as the single greatest “indicator” of a persistent “social inequality” in the United States.138  
At the turn of the century, only twenty-two percent of African Americans owned a house 
compared to forty-five percent of the whites.139 While there were several different patterns of small 
growth and decline during the twentieth century, the gap remained fairly constant, decreased to a small 
degree for a short period of time, but ultimately increased on several occasions.140 By 1960, thirty-nine 
percent of African Americans owned their homes but sixty-six percent of whites owned a home, an 
increase over sixty years in the racial gap of fifteen percent.141  
The testimonial results from the hearings in Washington, D.C. were also from just one city. The 
U.S. Civil Rights Commission held similar housing hearings in other cities.142 Prior to the Washington, 
D.C. hearings in 1962, the Commission had already held hearings in New York, Atlanta, and Chicago, 
and uncovered similar racial patterns and results.143 This means that the economic oppression created by 
government policy over decades is not contained to one city and there is likely very specific evidence of 
that policy, its implementation, and who exactly was affected by the policy (as in the Washington D.C. 
hearings). Other evidence is also available regarding other major American cities in regards to housing 
discrimination towards African Americans. 
 For example, a 1967 study regarding St. Louis determined that the home ownership rate in that 
city would have been thirty percent higher “if blacks had been able to purchase homes at the same rate 
of whites at similar life cycle stages and with similar income, education, and employment 
characteristics.”144 The conclusion of the study, like the testimony from the 1962 Washington, D.C. 
hearings, is fairly consistent with the factual history of the issue: 
In addition, their results showed that black homebuyers paid more than whites for 
equivalent housing. They concluded that restriction on the supply of housing—a 
function of segregation and housing market discrimination—was the root cause of both 
the home ownership deficit and higher ownership costs for blacks.145 
The results of the St. Louis study are not the exception either; this is essentially the norm in cites 
with high concentrations of African Americans and it was due to the policy forged by the government 
and the accompanying actions of the various private actors.146 For example, the city of Detroit presented 
similar patterns of home ownership as St. Louis during a similar period.147  
Even more revealing are the statistics on FHA mortgages. Of all the home mortgage loans 
financed in the U.S. between 1946 and 1959, “blacks purchased less than 2 percent of all loans financed 
with the assistance of federal mortgage insurance.”148 In addition, evidence regarding cities across the 
country establishes the existence of racial discrimination and segregation in housing at the time of the 
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1962 hearings.149 The issue, therefore, is not whether racism impacted the economic status of African 
Americans in the twentieth century and beyond; it is to what extent African Americans were impacted by 
their choices and who specifically was impacted by the policy.  
B. The Swelling “Racial” Chasm in the 21st Century 
Economic inequality between the races, a direct result of housing discrimination decades ago, is 
a phenomenon that is barely discussed in society today as a policy concern. It is important to place this 
social phenomenon in proper context because the actions described in the Washington, D.C. hearings in 
1962 have had long lasting implications for real racial inequality. 
According to Michael Powell, in a 2010 New York Times article on the subject, “[t]he reasons 
for” the wealth “gap are rooted deep in this nation’s racial history. Government policy shut many blacks 
out of homeownership during the depths of the Depression.”150 “Discriminatory bank lending and real 
estate practices” assured segregated neighborhoods and economic inequality.151 
Sociologist and Brandeis University Professor Thomas Shapiro stresses that the impact of this 
historical policy, the failure to address the problem, and new policies that continue to promote the 
wealth gap are ever present.152 While the wealth gap between whites and blacks was approximately 
$20,000 in 1984, by 2007 it had risen to $95,000.153 Professor Shapiro identifies several factors that can 
explain this increase in the wealth gap, including tax policies that perpetuate inequality and labor 
problems.154 However, a continued lack of equal access to credit for home mortgages is a primary factor 
according to Shapiro.155 
Shapiro’s analysis of high earning African Americans is particularly striking. According to 
Shapiro, middle income white families accumulated an average of $74,000 in wealth from 1984-2007. 
However, on average, high earning African American families only accumulated $18,000 during this 
same period. Shapiro stresses that the increasing wealth gap cannot be explained by looking at income.156 
Other evidence also supports Shapiro’s conclusions regarding the wealth gap years before 
Shapiro’s latest conclusions. For example, a study conducted by the University of Michigan in 2000 
concluded that access to home ownership remained a major issue for African Americans as compared to 
whites.157 The study focused upon renters in 1991 and learned that by 1996, twenty-nine percent of the 
whites had purchased a home compared to only twelve percent of the African Americans in the focus 
group.158 
Of course, the concern with respect to the homeownership gap and the wealth gap is what it has 
produced and will continue to produce: an unequal society divided by race, on an economic basis. It is 
again Professor Shapiro who examined the problem as a real societal issue that cannot be ignored 
because of the by-products of the phenomenon. 	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Shapiro describes wealth as the “single dimension in which whites and blacks are persistently 
unequal” and contends that the study of its relationship to racial inequality on economic terms has been 
“neglected.”159 Darrick Hamilton corroborates Shapiro’s conclusions. He notes: “Despite an enormous 
and persistent black-white wealth gap, the ascendant American narrative is one that proclaims our society 
has transcended the racial divide. But wealth is a paramount indicator of social well-being.”160 
According to Hamilton, “[w]ealthier families are better positioned to afford elite education, 
access capital to start a business, finance expensive medical procedures, reside in higher-amenity 
neighborhoods, exert political influence through campaign contributions, purchase better legal 
representation, leave a bequest, and withstand financial hardship resulting from an emergency.”161 
V. LESSONS OF THE 1962 HEARINGS AND THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS OF 2007 
 A. The American Racial Dynamic 
 The past racial injustices in the United States continue to shape the present and future. Housing 
discrimination now has two difficult issues to address. First, past government policy in the housing 
market was discriminatory against African Americans and other minorities and promoted economic 
inequality. Nothing has ever been done to address this problem.162 Second, present government policies 
regarding home ownership and wealth accumulation and preservation, will not alter the past and do not 
address current abuses in the housing market.163 In the current foreclosure crisis, there is evidence of 
continued discriminatory behavior by private actors in the housing market.164  
 For the last four years, the United States has been experiencing a destructive foreclosure crisis 
within the housing market that is resulting in loss of homes and wealth, and the devaluation of entire 
communities.165 A racial component to the crisis has emerged over the last few years.166 This is perhaps 
unintentional but nevertheless, race is still a major part of the crisis. 
 Due to the fact that African Americans and other minorities were confronting great difficulties 
in the area of homeownership in the 1990’s, President Bill Clinton sought to address the deficiency from 
1994 to 1995 by implementing a major homeownership initiative that would allow financial institutions 
to offer home purchase opportunities to groups that were historically underrepresented in the housing 
market. The initiative was known as “The National Homeownership Strategy.”167 A major part of 
President Clinton’s homeownership initiative was contained in a document known as “Urban Policy 
Brief #2.”168  
 The document was created at the request of President Clinton and was intended to be an 
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next 6 years.”169 President Clinton began the homeownership initiative specifically because 
homeownership levels had dropped significantly from 1980 to 1991.170 This included significant declines 
in the homeownership rate for African Americans and Latinos.171 The initiative, noting the government’s 
successful history in promoting homeownership for more than sixty years, expressly desired to target 
these groups and also underserved communities in an effort to increase homeownership.172 It was not 
solely a government effort but was a public-private partnership: 
Under the leadership of Secretary Cisneros, HUD has forged a nationwide partnership 
that will draw on the resources and creativity of lenders, builders, real estate 
professionals, community-based nonprofit organizations, consumer groups, State and 
local governments and housing finance agencies, and many others in a cooperative, 
multifaceted campaign to create ownership opportunities and reduce the barriers facing 
underserved populations and communities.173 
 The initiative proposed various means with which to accomplish this goal, including “expanding 
homeownership education and counseling,” “opening the home buying market to underserved 
communities,” and “making financing available, affordable, and flexible.”174 President Clinton’s initiative 
called for alternative financing products and changes in down payment requirements and interest costs in 
an effort to extend homeownership opportunities to underrepresented groups. It is this area in particular 
that became the area of exploitation that would contribute significantly to the foreclosure crisis.175  
 As is now reported, the private institutions responsible for providing financing to consumers 
seeking to purchase homes or to refinance existing homes targeted some groups more than others with 
risky loan products more likely to result in a default upon that mortgage or loan.176 This practice is 
commonly known as “reverse redlining.” 177 Where redlining, as described previously in this Article is the 
denial of an opportunity to purchase a home on racial grounds, reverse redlining is the exact opposite. 
Minority communities (an area with a large number of African Americans for example) are targeted with 
risky mortgage products because they are a minority such as African American or Latino.178 At the center 
of the foreclosure crisis, African Americans were disproportionately sold “subprime” mortgage 
products.179 This predatory lending was the front end of the current foreclosure crisis.180  	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Once consumers defaulted on these loans, the housing market collapsed followed by the entire 
global economy.181 When the evidence revealed that the surge in foreclosures was due to the intentional 
actions of financial institutions in selling deceptive loan products to African Americans, legal actions 
commenced. 
For example, the City of Memphis sued Wells Fargo Bank specifically on this basis.182 In June 
2010, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC) filed a similar lawsuit against Wells Fargo 
alleging reverse redlining tactics towards African-Americans in the city of Philadelphia.183 The PHRC 
complaint states, in pertinent part the following: 
Since at least 2004 and continuing to the present, Respondents have been engaged in the 
unlawful discriminatory practice of reverse redlining by targeting African Americans and 
African American neighborhoods in Philadelphia for deceptive, predatory or otherwise 
unfair lending practices. Respondents’ unlawful discriminatory practices have 
contributed significantly to the disproportionately large number of foreclosures found 
among African American borrowers and in Philadelphia’s African American 
communities.184 
The details of the lawsuit are more understandable than a technical lawsuit when spoken in 
statistical terms. According to media reports during the legal dispute, about fifty-one percent of loans 
from 2004 to 2008 sold in the city of Philadelphia were to African Americans and were of the high-risk 
variety (subprime), prone to default and foreclosures.185 This disproportionate concentration of lending 
was consistent with national figures dating back to the 1990’s.186 Only about nineteen percent of the 
loans to whites living in Philadelphia could be categorized as high risk.187 Other cities and areas have 
reported similar statistics.188 This lawsuit has recently been settled as part of a larger legal action against 
Wells Fargo by the U.S. Department of Justice. The settlement was estimated at $175 million overall and 
$2 million specifically to residents of the Philadelphia area.189 
  The data is also quite detailed and is conclusive that there is a racial component to the lending 
patterns. According to data collected by the federal government pursuant to the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA), subprime lending in communities of color played a role in the collapse of the 
mortgage market.190 The data collected also indicated that individuals from communities of color were 
sold loans in a disproportionate manner that contained “toxic terms” and “unmanageable obligations.”191 
The data has also been fairly consistent that there is discrimination based upon race in the mortgage 
lending market.192 
The rate of subprime loans sold in 1998 to upper income African American communities was 	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thirty-nine percent while the rate for whites was only six percent. 193 The rate for low-income whites was 
only eighteen percent, meaning upper income African Americans were much more likely to be sold an 
expensive, foreclosure prone loan than a low-income white person.194 In 2005, half of the loans sold to 
African Americans were subprime loans.195 In 2006, similar statistics have been recorded by HMDA.196 
The Clinton initiative encouraged lenders to extend mortgages to African Americans and other 
minorities, which, as previously mentioned, were often subprime loans. 
The by-product of this evolutionary cycle in the housing market is that African Americans are 
losing their homes to foreclosures and as a result, losing the wealth they had accumulated or were 
attempting to accumulate.197According to the Economic Policy Institute, the statistics over the last few 
years on the issue of wealth loss during this foreclosure crisis are clear: 
In 2004, the median net worth of white households was $134,280, compared with 
$13,450 for black households, according to an analysis of Federal Reserve data by the 
Economic Policy Institute. By 2009, the median net worth for white households had 
fallen 24 percent to $97,860; the median net worth for black households had fallen 83 
percent to $2,170, according to the institute.198 
Thus, private actors who implemented their programs at the urging of the federal government have 
decimated existing family wealth during this housing crisis and economic recession as a result of the 
racial discrimination.  
But the other component of this latest crisis that involves race and the housing market and how 
mortgage financing was administered involves government oversight. Specifically, President Clinton 
called for fair lending practices by the institutions involved in the initiative in his homeownership 
strategy.199 There is no indication that President Clinton called for these private actors to discriminate or 
to disobey existing anti-discrimination laws to accomplish his goals of increased homeownership.200  
According to a Democratic Policy Committee report prepared in October 2008 with respect to 
oversight of subprime mortgage selling practices, the Bush Administration ignored the warning signs 
regarding the problems arising relating to these practices.201 The report adds that the Republicans who 
controlled Congress during the burgeoning years of the creation of the crisis (1994–2006) harbored 
hostility towards regulation.202  
In addition, the Bush Administration not only resisted any regulation; the administration 
remained committed to more deregulation even as problems began to arise in the mortgage market.203 
There was little oversight during this period and speculators were encouraged to continue their risky 
practices that would eventually result in a collapse of the housing market and the economy.204 To a 
certain degree, the government has taken action on this issue.205 This includes the passage of a new 	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comprehensive consumer protection act that purports to address some of the abuses.206  
 B. Government Inaction and Delay: the 1962 Hearings 
 One problem with today’s foreclosure crisis and the racial issues in that crisis is a delay by the 
government to act or to correct problems. Eugene Davidson, former President of the Washington, D.C. 
Real Estate Broker’s Association, testified regarding discrimination at the 1962 hearings, stressing why 
delaying to correct racial problems is destructive: 
I have been disturbed very much today by statements of some witnesses that time is 
going to cure this. I was disturbed by one of them talking about 10 years and another 
talking about 3 years, and I think we have got to realize that we have before us an urgent 
problem, that the time is past for the luxury of discrimination and people having to 
discriminate against fellow people.207 
 In addition, the Commission issued findings and recommendations following the hearings and 
only a portion of the recommendations were ever implemented though many years later.208 For example, 
the Commission recommended, among other things, a “regulation prohibiting discrimination on the 
basis of race, color, religion, or national origin, in the sale, rental, or financing of housing 
accommodations within the District of Columbia.”209 This recommendation is, by its language, the Fair 
Housing Act of 1968.210 Other recommendations also shared some connection with the Fair Housing 
Act, including Recommendations 2 and 3 which also prohibited discrimination by real estate brokers and 
salesmen (Recommendation 2), and attempted to correct the use of racial covenants in titles to property 
(Recommendation 3). No recommendations were offered to address past injustices.211 
 Other laws such as the Community Reinvestment Act and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
followed within the decade and these laws as well possessed some connection to recommendations of 
the Commission.212 But these laws were also passed over a decade later and also did not address past 
injustices and lacked the ability to actually address discrimination in the housing market. This provides 
the other lesson that can be gathered from the hearings: the government should act quickly to address 
racial problems in the housing market.  
 Of course, this inequality, unlike civic inequality (right to vote, public accommodations, public 
education, etc.), has never been addressed. The Fair Housing Act addressed some of the systemic 
problems but the inequality that was created has been ignored. There is barely any discussion regarding 
what to do about the problem even though the facts are available.  
 With respect to the current mortgage crisis and the racial component, it is apparent that the 
racial chasm is growing judging by the wealth gap evidence gathered by Professor Shapiro and others.213 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Based upon the historical discussion in this Article and modern evidence of housing 
discrimination, only aggressive action will address the problem created at least, in part, by the federal 
government. In addition, discrimination that has occurred in the past in the housing market must be 
addressed in some manner quickly.  
 Due to rapid developments in the current foreclosure crisis, recommendations for action evolve 
quickly. To its credit, the federal government has even implemented a few recommendations that were 
discussed earlier in this Article.214 However, even with these improved efforts there is no government 
focus upon the wealth disparity of the past or the loss of wealth stemming from the current foreclosure 
crisis. The efforts of the government are limited in scope and will not address the problem completely or 
to a significant degree.  
 The following recommendations would add more intensity to the effort to address the overall 
problem of economic inequality and reform of the housing market into the future: 
1. Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
 A Truth and Reconciliation Commission should thoroughly examine the available evidence 
regarding the policy of the Federal Housing Administration from 1934, and how that policy led to the 
denial of home purchases by African Americans and anyone else of any other race or ethnicity. Monetary 
restitution for past policies of the federal government should not be ruled out for any individual or 
family regardless of race or ethnicity, but that is not the stated goal. Considering the enormous racial gap 
between the races due to past abuses in the housing market, those who would have benefited from equal 
treatment in the past can receive that benefit now.215  
 The Commission should investigate the actions of the government and financial institutions, and 
the contemporary effects of these historical actions. The Commission should attempt to identify 
individuals who actually were denied equal treatment in the housing market in order to compare 
outcomes.  
 But the true significance of the formation of such an entity is it is an acknowledgement that the 
racial problems of the past present lingering economic challenges that must be addressed. Even if no 
monetary restitution is provided, the information uncovered by the effort could also contribute to a 
healing process as the nation seeks to move forward. In much the way South Africa made use of a Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission in the post-apartheid era, the United States can make use of a 
commission to investigate financial abuses over the past seventy to eighty years.216 While the South 
African commission addressed racial violence, the model is relevant because of the impact of the 
violence upon the lives of ordinary citizens on the basis of race. This commission would have a similar 
goal of investigating the impact upon the lives of ordinary citizens. 
2. Bankruptcy Reform 
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 Amend the bankruptcy code enabling bankruptcy judges to “cram down”217 the principal 
amounts on the mortgage loans of consumers filing bankruptcy. This will allow many consumers to 
emerge from bankruptcy in a better financial position and will also afford them the opportunity to 
refinance their homes with more affordable interest rates and at prices they can afford. This 
recommendation has been presented numerous times to lawmakers in Congress and it has failed to pass 
into law each time due to intense political pressure from financial institutions.218  
3. Principal Reduction 
 Reduce the principal on mortgages on homes in areas where the foreclosure rate is exceedingly 
high and/or the drop in value of the home is quite excessive. Provide these homeowners (if reasonably 
credit worthy) with a new mortgage on fair, manageable terms that take into account the risk and the 
ability to satisfy the mortgage. As alluded to above, this recommendation has been partially adopted on a 
small scale by the Obama administration. The important aspect is it would allow homeowners to retain 
their homes and maintain their asset and the possibility of building future wealth.  
4. Housing Discrimination Enforcement 
Invigorate housing discrimination enforcement with a real commitment to reduce the level of 
discrimination currently in existence with additional funding and resources with which to address 
housing discrimination. The National Fair Housing Alliance has sought increased funding for 
enforcement of the nation’s housing discrimination laws. Current funding is inadequate. 
 In 2010, Congress held hearings on the Housing Fairness Act and this Act’s purpose was to 
strengthen housing discrimination enforcement efforts.219 Some who testified at the hearings on the bill 
proposed additional funding for fair housing enforcement above the current amounts provided over the 
last few years.220 However, before the law could be presented for a congressional vote, the Democrats 
lost control of Congress and the bill has had no activity since that time.  
 While there are many other actions that can be taken to address the housing crisis and the 
problem of economic inequality, these recommendations have been circulated in various advocacy 
circles. Resistance to these proposals has been fierce; it is not likely any of these recommendations has 
any chance of becoming law or policy for reasons political and philosophical. However, the resistance 
has ramifications beyond the housing market. 
 As the writer and human rights lawyer Randall Robinson has written, if the problem of 
economic inequality amongst the races is not addressed, it is not likely that racial problems will 
disappear.221 In other words, a post-racial America will remain elusive.222  
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